November 2022 Hearings
November 16, 2022*
Bernardez v. Las Vegas Boat Harbor, et. al.
Case Summary: This matter arises out of an negligence and product defect incident that took place on July 1, 2018 in Clark County, Nevada. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated March 16, 2020. Plaintiffs were on a 1988 Carver Yacht 27 Santego located in the Lake Mead area at Defendant Las Vegas Boat Harbor. Id. at ¶ 3. While at the Defendant Las Vegas Boat Harbor fuel dock, the engine and the batteries on the subject yacht would not start. Id. at ¶ 4. As a result, Defendant Las Vegas Boat Harbor employees gave Plaintiff Dylan Daugherty a Schumacher Instant Power Jump Starter to restart the yacht’s battery. Id. Plaintiff Dylan Daugherty followed the verbal instructions of the Las Vegas Boat Harbor employees and attached the Schumacher Instant Power Jump Starter to the boat’s battery and turned the jump box power switch on. Id. at ¶ 5. As soon as Plaintiff Dylan Daugherty turned the jump box on, there was an explosion and a fire ensued. Id.
(1) Defendant’s Objection to the Discovery Commissioner’s Report and Recommendations
On July 14, 2022, Defendant served its Notice of Intent To Serve Subpoena Duces Tecum For Records Only upon Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and Clark County District Attorney for August 26, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. Therein, Defendant requested documentation as they pertain to Plaintiff, Dayton Bernardez’s, criminal action in the Eighth Judicial District Court. On July 21, 2022, Plaintiffs served an Objection to Defendant’s subpoenas and filed a Motion for Protective Order requesting that the Court issue a protective order prohibiting Defendant from obtaining documents via subpoena duces tecum from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the Clark County District Attorney because the information requested was irrelevant to any party’s claims or defenses and disproportionate to the needs of this case pursuant to NRCP 26(c)(1).
On August 26, 2022, the parties argued their respective positions before Discovery Commissioner Jay Young. After hearing oral argument from counsel, Commissioner Young found that the burden placed on a non-party to produce documents that Defendant partially already has in its possession outweighs the marginal utility sought. Commissioner Young further found that the information Defendant intended to discover is accessible through other means—such as written discovery directly to the party. After considering the proportionality factors set forth under NRCP 26(b), Commissioner Young adopted Plaintiffs’ good cause analysis and found that a protective order was warranted in this circumstance.
On September 30, 2022, Defendant filed its Objection to the Discovery Commissioner’s DCRR From August 25, 2022, (Sic) Hearing Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order. Therein, Defendant argues that Discovery Commissioner Young erred in granting Plaintiff’s request for a protective order because he failed to take into account Defendant’s right to impeach Mr. Bernardez with independent facts obtained from third-party sources and limiting Defendant to only the information Mr. Bernardez would provide is highly prejudicial. Defendant further argued that Commissioner Young failed to adequately weigh the minimal inconvenience that serving the subpoenas to public entities against the damages Mr. Bernardez is alleging in this matter.
Defendant alleges that the information it seeks to request is proportional to the needs of this case because Mr. Bernardez had the physical capability to fire a gun despite the claims made by him and his experts that his inability to work is directly related to those same physical capabilities—his hands. However, neither Mr. Bernardez nor his experts have alleged that his inability to return to work is directly and solely due to his hand injuries and burns sustained in the boat explosion. Mr. Bernardez has not been able to return to gainful employment due to his hand conditions, his lower back injury, and his existing psychological conditions. Simply stated, even if Mr. Bernardez’s hand condition was not an issue, he still would not be physically or mentally capable of returning to his former job as a phlebotomist or any other form of employment at this time. Defendant is conflating multiple issues to annoy, harass, and embarrass Mr. Bernardez.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court affirm and adopt the Discovery Commissioner’s Report and Recommendations from the August 25, 2022, hearing regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order.
November 17, 2022*
Orly Graves v. Steven Marovitz
Case Summary: This case arises out of a physical assault and battery by Defendant Steven Marovitz on Plaintiff Orly Graves while she was working at the Wynn Casino and Resort. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, dated September 4, 2020. On December 6, 2019, Mr. Marovitz was in Las Vegas, Nevada, residing as a guest at the Wynn Las Vegas. Id. at ¶ 4. That same evening, Mr. Marovitz arrived at a table game in the area that Ms. Graves was supervising at the time. Id. at ¶ 6. As Mr. Marovitz was gambling, he assaulted Ms. Graves by grabbing her right hand and licking it with his tongue. Id. at ¶ 10. Ms. Graves immediately withdrew her hand while Mr. Marovitz took his other hand and tried to wipe off the slobber he left on her hand. Id. Ms. Graves immediately left the area where Mr. Marovitz was gambling, approached a podium, and wiped her hand with a sanitizer wipe. Id. at ¶ 11. A short time after the initial assault, Mr. Marovitz again assaulted Ms. Graves, this time by grabbing her and placing her in a “bear hold” while Ms. Graves was trying to hit him at his sides so that he would release her from his grip. Id. at ¶ 12.
Thereafter, Mr. Marovitz laughed as one of his friend’s told him to stop because he was out of line. Id. at ¶ 13. After the second incident, Ms. Graves left the casino floor to go on break. Id. at ¶ 14. At 11:15 p.m., Ms. Graves returned to her workstation on the casino floor where Mr. Marovitz was still at the table game with his friends. Id. at ¶ 15. The final assault occurred when Mr. Marovitz approached Ms. Graves from behind, grabbed her body, and then grabbed her head, turning it toward himself as he tried to force his tongue into her mouth. Id. at ¶ 16. Shortly after the final assault, a casino manager arrived in the area and Ms. Graves was replaced by another floor person. Id. at ¶ 17. The casino manager spoke with Mr. Marovitz and at approximately 11:41 p.m., Mr. Marovitz and his friends left the table game and general area. Id. at ¶ 18. After an investigation of the incidents, Mr. Marovitz was trespassed from the Wynn Las Vegas, on December 7, 2019, at 11:20 p.m., and a “Be On the Look Out” was issued by the Wynn Las Vegas. Id. at ¶ 19.
(1) Plaintiff’s Objection to Discovery Commissioner’s Report and Recommendations
On August 15, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Independent Medical Examination on Order Shortening time. Defendant requests that Plaintiff undergo a Rule 35 Examination by Dr. Gregory Brown, a forensic psychiatrist. Defendant argued that based on Plaintiff’s prior medical treatment with her treating physician, Behzad Kermani, M.D., who is neither a psychologist or a psychiatrist, Plaintiff has opened the door for a second Rule 35 examination by a forensic psychiatrist who can opine on psychological conditions and medications.
On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Independent Medical Examination. Therein, Plaintiff argued that prior to the subject incident, Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Kermani for various unrelated medical conditions, as well as generalized stress and anxiety related to her lack of sleep and family-related stress. As a result, Dr. Kermani prescribed Plaintiff with anti-depressants to help relieve her stress and to help her sleep. Importantly, Plaintiff never sought treatment with a mental health provider and was never diagnosed with any mental health ailments prior to the subject incident. Further, Plaintiff was never prescribed any medications to treat the psychological conditions she developed as a result of the subject incident—post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Lastly, Plaintiff never continued taking the medication to treat her generalized stress and anxiety and is not currently taking any medications as a result of her prior treatment or this incident.
As a result of the subject incident, Plaintiff suffers from anxiety, PTSD, and depression. Thereafter, Plaintiff began treating with a therapist and a psychologist to address her general emotional distress claims. Plaintiff continues to treat with a psychologist to assess her symptoms through behavioral intervention methods, not medication management. Importantly, Plaintiff has not alleged that she is suffering from any psychiatric conditions as a result of the subject sexual assault. Plaintiff further has not sought any treatment with a psychiatrist as a result of the subject sexual assault. Moreover, at Defendant’s request, Plaintiff has already undergone an 8-hour independent psychological examination by Dr. John Paglini. As such, Defendant cannot demonstrate good cause to require Plaintiff to undergo a second independent medical examination in this matter because his request is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and not proportional to the needs of this case. Lastly, even if good cause was shown, Defendant failed to specifically identify any details regarding the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination.
On August 26, 2022, the parties argued their respective positions before Discovery Commissioner Jay Young. After hearing oral argument from counsel, Discovery Commissioner Jay Young found that because additional information was disclosed by Plaintiff in her deposition testimony, responses to written discovery, and Plaintiff’s supplemental disclosure of records from Dr. Kermani after the initial Rule 35 Examination was completed by Dr. Paglini, there was good cause for a second Rule 35 Examination. Based upon this finding, Discovery Commissioner Young recommended that Plaintiff submit to a Rule 35 Examination, not to exceed two hours, by Dr. Gregory Brown, M.D. Id.
On September 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Objection to the Discovery Commissioner’s Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff argued that the Court should vacate the Discovery Commissioner’s Report and Recommendations because: (1) Plaintiff has not alleged that she sustained any psychiatric conditions as a result Defendant’s sexual assault; (2) Plaintiff has not sought any treatment with a psychiatrist as a result of Defendant’s sexual assault; (3) Defendant cannot establish good cause warranting a second IPE of Plaintiff since her psychiatric condition is not in controversy; and (4) Defendant has failed to set forth the specific time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of his requested IPE.
November 22, 2022*
Schrader v. Wynn Las Vegas, et. Al.
Case Summary: This matter arises from countless instances of varying degrees of sexual assault committed by Defendant Stephan Wynn and Mr. Wynn’s friends and/or affiliates, against Plaintiff Brenna Schrader and numerous other victims, all of whom worked as Defendants’ employees. See Plaintiff’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated September 1, 2022.
(1) Defendants Wynn Resorts, Limited and Wynn Las Vegas, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss
As a result of Defendants’ alleged misconduct in creating and maintaining an illegal sex scheme to abuse female employees, Plaintiff filed a federal class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. After successfully seeking leave to amend the Federal Complaint, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, which Defendants sought to dismiss. Upon review of the parties’ pleadings and after argument, the federal court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff’s Nevada RICO claim from her Federal Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Following the federal court’s dismissal of the Nevada RICO claim, Plaintiff filed the instant action in Nevada State court alleging one cause of action: Violation of NRS 207.400, et. seq. Defendants again filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Nevada RICO claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the State Action is barred by issue preclusion, that the State Action is barred by the statute of limitations, that Plaintiff failed to allege the requisite elements of the predicate acts under the Nevada Racketeering Act, that Plaintiff failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise, that Plaintiff lacks standing because she failed to sufficiently allege a RICO injury, and that the Court should dismiss the State Action pursuant to the first-to-file rule. In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that her State Action is not barred by issue preclusion nor by the statute of limitations. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations in the State Complaint are sufficiently pleaded pursuant to Nevada law. Finally, the first-to-file rule is inapplicable in this case because the federal court dismissed the Nevada RICO claim entirely.
November 30, 2022*
Mead v. General Motors, LLC
Case Summary: This is a strict product liability-only matter arising from a defective two-point lap belt manufactured and installed by Defendant General Motors, LLC. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated May 15, 2020.
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Lack of Comparative Negligence
Under Nevada law, comparative or contributory fault is not a viable legal defense to a strict product liability claim. Thus, while contributory and/or comparative negligence may be an appropriate affirmative defense in a negligence action, it is not an appropriate affirmative defense in a strict product liability action. Young’s Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 694 (1984). It is anticipated that GM will argue that Allie is comparatively at fault for her injuries and damages because she improperly wore the defective two-point lap belt at the time of the subject collision. However, it is Plaintiff’s position that GM has no evidence to meet its burden of proof that Allie improperly wore the two-point lap belt at the time of the subject collision. But even if GM had evidence to prove that Allie improperly wore the two-point lap belt, Allie voluntarily dismissed her Second and Sixth Causes of Action as they relate to any negligence claim against GM. As such, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims against GM are strict product liability and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose of merchantability. Thus, this case is now exclusively a strict product liability action and GM’s comparative fault affirmative defense should be stricken as a matter of law.
Moreover, NRS 41.141(3) provides that if a codefendant settles with a plaintiff and the remaining defendant asserts a comparative negligence defense, the jury may not consider the settling codefendant’s comparative negligence. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 120 Nev. 822, 844 (2004). Defendant Nathan Grace is a settled codefendant and as such, any comparative negligence of Defendant Nathan Grace should not be admitted into evidence or presented to the jury. Further, Allie was a fault-free passenger at the time of the subject collision. Thus, any negligence of Defendant Nathan Grace should not be imputed upon Allie.
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Assumption of the Risk and Unforeseeable Misuse Affirmative Defenses
In Nevada, the only defenses available in a strict product liability action are assumption of the risk and misuse of the product. Young’s Mach. Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 693-694 (1984). It is anticipated that GM will argue that Allie somehow assumed the risk of her injuries and damages because she chose to ride as a passenger in Nathan Grace’s vehicle and use the defective two-point lap belt without heeding to any respective warnings. It is also anticipated that GM will argue that Allie wore the two-point lap belt incorrectly and that such alleged misuse was unforeseeable. It is Plaintiff’s position that GM’s anticipated arguments are factually nonsensical and legally contrary to long-standing Nevada law. Moreover, it is Plaintiff’s position that GM has no evidentiary support to maintain its assumption of the risk and unforeseeable misuse affirmative defenses. As such, GM’s assumption of the risk and unforeseeable misuse affirmative defenses should be dismissed as a matter of law.
(3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Pre-Instruct the Jury on Strict Product Liability Law
Pursuant to NRCP 51(a)(1), trial courts have the discretion to instruct the jury on points of law and procedure they deem necessary or helpful before trial begins. Nevada trial courts routinely instruct jurors before trial on various issues because pre-instruction informs the jurors of the duties they bear during trial and what to keep in mind as they listen to evidence.
Before the commencement of opening statements, Allie respectfully requests that the Court pre-instruct the jury on the specific jury instructions embodying strict product liability, law of evidence, burden of proof in civil cases, and other key instructions in clear and plain English so the jurors can understand that their job is assessing the merits of the case as the evidence is being presented to them. Many, if not all, of the jurors will be entirely unfamiliar with the jury trial process, therefore it would be extremely helpful to pre-instruct them on certain matters before the introduction of opening statements.
October 2022 Hearings
October 12, 2022*
Ashley Colwick v. Dicks Last Resort, et. al.
Case Summary: This matter arises from a sexual assault incident that occurred on September 26, 2021. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated August 10, 2022. Plaintiff visited a Dick’s Last Resort restaurant and was allegedly sexually assaulted by a waiter. Id.
(1) Defendant Dick Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike
On September 9, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike arguing that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action and strike the screenshot reviews contained in the First Amended Complaint. According to Defendant, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence per se because NRS 201.220, as a criminal statute, cannot form the basis for a negligence per se claim. Defendant also argues that the injury Ashley suffered is not of the type that NRS 201.220 was designed to protect against. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has only prohibited the application of negligence per se to criminal statutes in two contexts, neither of which apply here. Moreover, the unwanted and nonconsensual exposure of a woman’s breasts, such as Ashley’s in this case, is one of the types of injuries that NRS 201.220 was intended to prevent.
Next, Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiffs failed to plead the “physical impact” element as required under Nevada law. However, because Plaintiffs are only bringing one claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the bystander theory, they were not required to allege any “physical impact.”
Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should strike the screenshot reviews contained in the First Amended Complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(f). However, Plaintiffs argue that not only is granting motions to strike under NRCP 12(f) strongly disfavored, but Defendant failed to show that the screenshot reviews are unresponsive and unrelated to the claims at issue in this case.
August 2022 Hearings
August 15, 2022*
Kennedy v. Martinez, et. al.
Case Summary: This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on November 5, 2018. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated February 15, 2022.A truck driven by Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing Plaintiff to suffer a traumatic brain injury and need 24/7 attendant care due to issues caused by the TBI. Id.
(1) Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to NRCP 37
Defendant Martinez admitted blame for causing the crash that totaled Plaintiffs’ vehicle and caused his vehicle to catch fire and was deposed on September 10, 2021. At his deposition, Martinez testified that for months leading up to the crash, he worked 60 plus hours per week as a rover security guard for Defendant Universal Protection Services. Thereafter, Plaintiffs propounded an interrogatory to UPS asking if it disputes Martinez’s testimony that he worked more than 60 hours per week for months leading up to the crash. In a response served on November 11, 2021, UPS represented that it is attempting to locate timekeeping records that might be relevant to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory. On March 11, 2022, Defendants produced for the first time a timekeeping report. However, the timekeeping report only dated back one week prior to the crash. Consistent with Martinez’s testimony, the timekeeping report showed that he worked more than 60 hours during the week of the crash. One week later, on March 18, 2022, Plaintiffs formally requested UPS to produce Martinez’s timekeeping report dating back to March 1, 2018. In a response served on April 18, 2022, UPS objected to producing any additional timecards claiming that the request is “overbroad in time and scope.” After numerous depositions, and just weeks before the close of discovery, Defendants produced Martinez’s complete timekeeping report on June 2, 2022. Without the benefit of the complete timekeeping report, and any indication that UPS disputes Martinez’s testimony that he worked 60-plus hours per week for months leading up to the crash, Plaintiffs’ counsel deposed numerous witnesses, including UPS’s NRCP 30(b)(6) witness. This outrageous misconduct by UPS and its counsel has prevented, Plaintiffs from conducting meaningful discovery to prove Martinez’s claim that UPS overworked him for months leading up to the crash.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to set an evidentiary hearing, and depending on what is learned at that hearing, Plaintiffs will likely ask for case dispositive sanctions. If this Court is not inclined to set an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs request that this Court sanction UPS and its counsel for their misconduct by permitting Plaintiffs to present a jury instruction regarding the undisputed fact to the jury during opening statements.
August 24, 2022*
Maroney, et. al. v. Las Vegas Dragon Hotel, LLC, et. al.
A-21-845156-C (Consolidated with A-20-808100-C)
Case Summary: This matter arises out of a fire that occurred on December 21, 2019, at the Alpine Motel Apartments, located at 213 North 9th Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated December 20, 2021.Plaintiffs in this consolidated action were tenants at the Alpine Motel and sustained injuries as a result of the fire. Id.
(1) Hearing on Plaintiffs Barbara Maroney and Christine Stelluti’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Deborah Cihal Crawford’s Complaint
Tracy Ann Cihal (“Decedent”) was a tenant at the Alpine Motel Apartments and died from her injuries. Tracy Ann Cihal died intestate. Thus, her heirs, pursuant to NRS 134.070, are her aunts, Plaintiffs Barbara Maroney and Christine Stelluti. On January 8, 2020, Deborah Cihal Crawford (“Crawford”), the Decedent’s purported sister-in-law, filed a Complaint, Case No. A-20-808100-C (the “Lead Case”), alleging that she was the “Special Administrator of the Estate of Tracy Ann Cihal” and alleging that she was the “heir to the Estate of Tracy Ann Cihal.” However, the Decedent’s heirs, Plaintiffs Christine Stelluti and Barbara Maroney, have priority to serve as Special Administrators of the Decedent’s Estate, and to make a nomination in their place pursuant to NRS 139.040 and 139.050. Accordingly, Christine Stelluti nominated Barbara Maroney and Lotus S. Herrera to act as Co-Special Administrators of the Decedent’s Estate to prosecute the Decedent’s claims against the Defendants. On October 13, 2020, Barbara Maroney and Lotus S. Herrera (collectively referred to as the “Special Administrators”) filed a Petition for Appointment of Co-Special Administrators and For Issuance of Special Letters of Administration. On February 12, 2021, the Court granted the Special Administrators’ Petition for Appointment of Co-Special Administrators and For Issuance of Special Letters of Administration. On March 11, 2021, the Letters of Special Administration were issued. Because the Special Administrators were granted the authority to commence and maintain an action on behalf of the Decedent’s Estate, on March 30, 2022, Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute the Special Administrators for the Decedent in the subject action was granted.
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 17(a) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Crawford’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because an action can only be brought by a party who possesses the right to enforce the claim. Crawford lacks standing to bring suit on behalf of the Decedent’s estate, and lacks standing to assert a claim on her own behalf. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Crawford’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs also respectfully request an award of attorney’s fees and costs for having to bring the instant Motion as Crawford’s Complaint was clearly brought, and maintained, without any legal or factual basis.
Morales v. Lopez
Case Summary: This case arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on June 19, 2017. Plaintiff was driving when Defendant allegedly failed to yield the right of way at a stop sign and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated December 23, 2019.
(1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Defendant’s Duty and Breach of NRS 484B.257
On March 9, 2022, the Court heard oral argument and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion on the basis that genuine issues of material fact exist as to Defendant’s duty and breach of NRS 484B.257 and to the location of Alma’s vehicle at the time of the collision. However, regardless of Alma’s alleged speed, Defendant was at a clearly marked stop sign and thus had a legal duty to yield Alma’s right-of-way. Importantly, Defendant does not dispute that Alma had the right-of-way and that he had a duty to yield the right-of-way to her. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendant’s duty under NRS 484B.257. Given that the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion as to duty, the Court’s denial was clearly erroneous. As a result of the Court’s clear error, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reconsider Plaintiffs’ Motion.
(2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Lack of Comparative Fault
On March 9, 2022, the Court heard oral argument and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion on the basis that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Alma’s speed. Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion because Defendant admitted under oath that he did not see Alma’s vehicle before or during the collision, and as such, he cannot testify as to her alleged speed. Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes that Alma was traveling at the speed limit at the time of the collision. Thus, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Alma’s speed.
(3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Motion in Limine No. 1: to Exclude Reference or Argument Regarding Plaintiff Alma Morales’s Speed
On March 9, 2022, the Court heard oral argument from both sides and ultimately denied Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 on the basis that speed is likely a “material fact” that may prove Defendant’s affirmative defense of contributory negligence. However, in rendering its decision, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 based on an incorrect legal standard and ignored controlling Nevada law. As a result of the Court’s clear errors, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reconsider Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1.
*Check court docket as hearing dates may be moved.